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Todd Foglesong and Christopher E. Stone 
 
 
With  funding  from  the  United  Kingdom’s  Department  for 
International Development, (DFID), the Program in Criminal 
Justice Policy and Management (PCJ) at the Harvard Kennedy 
School  has  been  supporting  state  officials  and  civil  society 
organizations  in  Jamaica,  Sierra  Leone,  and  Nigeria  to 
develop and use their own indicators to spark, reinforce, and 
communicate progress toward strategic goals in justice and 
safety.  In  2010,  PCJ  began  collaborating  with  officials  in 
Papua New  Guinea (PNG), extending existing efforts  in the 
law and justice sector funded by the Australian Government 
Aid Program (AusAID).  
The  aim  of  the  project  is  to  equip  government  and  civil 
society organizations with the skills and experience to design 
their  own  indicators,  routinely  assess  those  indicators,  and 
use  them  to  drive  meaningful  reform  in  the  justice  sector. 
Building  this  capacity  is  a  long-term  undertaking,  for  the 
desire for indicators and the skill in their construction must 
permeate  the  organizational  culture  in  governmental  and 
non‐governmental  bodies.    It  is  also  a  fluid  process: 
indicators serve ambitions, policies, governments, and staffs 
that inevitably change over time. 
The  prototype  indicators  developed  in  this  project  are 
different from the indicators in international systems created 
in the Global North for use in the Global South. They start by 
finding  successes,  however  modest,  and  strengthen  norms 
and standards that emerge in the course of reviewing local 
practices. They also perform different kinds of development 
work:  They  support  domestic  ambitions  for  justice  and 
safety, reinforce management operations in government, and 
align the work of individual agencies with sector-wide goals. 
At the same time, these and other examples of country-led 
indicator  development  complement  the  growing  number  of 
globally  conceived  indicator  projects  by  grounding  the 
measurement  culture  of  international  development  in  local 
customs, and by articulating domestic sources of legitimacy 
for  the  standards  implicit  in  the  norms  in  global  indicator 
projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many  governments,  civil  society  organizations, and 
international  development  agencies  today  seek  to 
limit the use of pretrial detention in criminal justice.  
Motivations  vary.    Some  believe  that  pretrial 
detention is ordered indiscriminately and employed 
for unreasonably long periods; others are concerned 
with the conditions of confinement and the burdens 
detention places on families; still others worry about 
the  criminogenic  effects  of  pretrial  incarceration.  
But whatever the motive to limit the use of pretrial 
detention,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  the  effort 
succeeding without a good indicator of the extent of 
its  use.   Such  an  indicator  has  proven  surprisingly 
elusive in countries at every income level.  
Indeed, it is possible that the effort to reduce pretrial 
detention  in  developing  countries  may  actually  be 
hindered  by  the  indicator  most  commonly  used 
there:  the proportion of prison inmates on any given 
day that is not sentenced.  This paper describes some 
of the flaws with this and other indicators, and shows 
how  domestic  governments  and  their  development 
partners  can  use  a  basic  and  better  indicator—the 
median  duration  of  detention—as  a  catalyst  for 
change.  The median number of days in detention is a 
simple  measure  that  domesticates  a  complex 
problem,  making  it  susceptible  to  reform,  whether 
used alone or in a basket of indicators.  It also helps 
government  officials  align  remedial  strategies  with 
existing systems of accountability for improvements 
in justice and safety. 
This  paper  demonstrates  a  simple  and  inexpensive 
way  of  developing  this  indicator  –  by  obtaining 
administrative data already collected in most prisons 
and jails about the people who leave detention each 
month.  Everywhere in the world, some number of 
detainees  ―exit‖  each  month:    some  released  to 
continue awaiting trial at liberty, others released at 
the end of their cases without a prison sentence, and 
still  others  whose  pretrial  detention  has  been Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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changed  to  a  sentence  of  incarceration  following  a 
criminal conviction. Virtually every prison and jail in 
the world records the dates of these ―exits‖ whether 
they are actual releases or merely the reclassification 
of a pretrial detainee as a sentenced prisoner.  Only 
these  administrative  data  can  generate  an  accurate 
measure  of  the  duration  of  detention.    Interviews 
with detainees after their release are unreliable and 
data on the length of detention of all detainees on a 
particular  date  measure  the  duration  of  detention 
before it is complete.   
The  prison  exit  data  are  not  a  panacea.    If  the 
duration of detention is exceptionally long, the data 
will only tell you how long detentions last for people 
originally detained many months ago.  It also takes a 
real  effort  to  establish  the  kind  of  rapport  and 
routines with prison officials that facilitate access to 
the records.  But prison exit samples can generate a 
reliable  measure  of  the  duration  of  detention  for 
virtually any justice system in the world with existing 
information  and  minimal  additional  resources.  
Moreover,  while  a  justice  system  in  the  midst  of 
major  reform  may  want  to  collect  these  data 
continuously,  it  will  often  be  enough  to  collect  the 
data  for  only  a  few  sample  months  each  year, 
comparing the same months year-to-year to measure 
progress. 
 
Problems with Population Percentages 
Most  justice  ministries,  development  agencies,  and 
non-governmental  organizations  working 
internationally  to  ameliorate  the  conditions  and 
consequences of incarceration rely on the number of 
people awaiting trial in prison (un-convicted or un-
sentenced)  on  any  given  day  as  the  basic  building 
block  for  two  standard  indicators  of  the  extent  of 
pretrial detention. To create the first indicator, that 
one-day pretrial population number is divided by the 
total  incarcerated  population  (sentenced  and  un-
sentenced) on that day, producing the percentage of 
the  prison  population  held  pretrial.  To  create  the 
other standard indicator, the same one-day pretrial 
population is divided by the residential population of 
the country, producing the rate of pretrial detention 
per 100,000 population.   
We can see this process at work in a recent review of 
pretrial  detention  in  Europe,  commissioned  by  the 
European  Union.1  In  the  chapter  on  Spain,  for 
example,  the  review  of  available  statistics  from 
national  and  international  source s  on  pretrial 
                                                 
1 A.M. van Kalmthout, M.M. Knapen, C. Morgenstern (eds.), 
Pre-trial Detention in the European Union: An Analysis of 
Minimum Standards in Pre-trial Detention and the Grounds for 
Regular Review in the Member States of the EU (Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.  Pretrial Detention Indicators for Spain, Various Sources Compared 
 
Source  Date 
Number of 
pre-trial 
detainees 
Pre-trial detainees as a 
percentage of the total 
prison population 
Pre-trial 
detention rate 
per 100,000 
ICPS  26-Oct-07      15,956   23.9%  35 
SPACE 1 2007: Spain  1-Sep-07        14,522   25.4%  32.1 
SPACE 1 2007: Catalonia  31-Dec-07        2,134   22.7%  29.6 
National Statistics  2006    15,065   23.5%  34 
 
 
Adapted from Pre-Trial Detention in the European Union, Chapter 26: Spain, Table 20, page 880.  The SPACE data 
are reported separately for Catalonia and Spain.  The authors of the chapter speculate that the ICPS data are calculated 
from combining the Spanish and Catalonian prison data, but relying on the residential population of Spain without 
Catalonia.  Other differences in the figures, other than the dates on which they are based, are explained by slight 
differences in the definition of pretrial detention. Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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detention  (prisión  provisional  and  prisión 
preventiva) focuses almost exclusively on population 
numbers.2  In  its  summary  table   (reproduced  in 
Figure  1) ,  the  report  compares  the  indicators 
produced by an NGO (the International Center for 
Prison Studies), the Council of Europe (through its 
SPACE surveys), and the national government (the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute). 
There are at least three problems with this way of 
measuring  pretrial  detention  if  the  goal  of  such 
measurement is to enable its reduction.  First, the 
percentage of prison inmates that is un -sentenced 
can  be  insensitive  to  significant  changes  in  the 
numbers of detainees.  We can see this problem in 
the Spanish example, where the numbers of pretrial 
detainees climbed by 73 percent from 2000 to 2007, 
a substantial increase, but the indicator measuring 
pretrial  detainees  as  a  percentage  of  the  prison 
population barely registered a change, as shown in 
Figure 2). The percentage indicator failed to register 
                                                 
2 Pre-Trial Detention in the European Union, Chapter 26, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/criminal/procedural/doc
/chapter_26_spain_en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2011).  
the  change  because  the  number  of  sentenced 
prisoners  was  increasing  for  other  reasons  in  this 
same period.  
Second,  neither  the  percentage  nor  the  rate  of 
pretrial  detention  based  on  the  population  on  a 
single  day  focuses  attention  on  the  work  of  any 
particular  government  department  or  function.    A 
simultaneous increase in both of the two indicators 
could, in theory, suggest a deterioration in the ability 
of prosecutors, judges, and courtroom professionals 
to  move  criminal  cases  fairly  and  efficiently  to 
resolution, swelling the numbers of accused persons 
languishing  in  detention;  but  the  same  increase  in 
both  indicators  could  be  consistent  with  steady, 
reasonable  performance  by  the  courts  while  the 
police  increased  dramatically  the  number  of 
apprehensions  of  suspects,  or  the  rate  of  serious 
crime  itself  increased.    Judges  and  prosecutors 
therefore might easily dispute that changes in these 
indicators are their responsibility, or they may feel 
impotent to bring them down in a context of rising 
crime.  These indicators, in short, neither strengthen 
nor reward existing systems of legal administration.  
Third, international comparisons on these indicators 
tend to contradict one another, hiding as much as  
 
Figure 2.  Number of Pretrial Detainees and their Percentage of the Prison Population in Spain, 
2000-2007 
 
 
 
Adapted from Pre-Trial Detention in the European Union, Chapter 26: Spain: Figures 1 and 2, pages 870-71. 
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they reveal. Countries such as the United States that 
appear  to  have  relatively  low  percentages  of  their 
prisoners  held  in  pretrial  detention  might  be 
masking  their  heavy  use  of  pretrial  detention  by 
sentencing many offenders to very long prison terms.  
On the other hand, countries, such as Nigeria, that 
appear  to  have  relatively  low  per  capita  rates  of 
pretrial detention, may be masking broken systems 
of  judicial  administration  in  urban  areas  because 
their per capita rates are deflated by their very large 
rural populations.  These distortions of international 
comparisons  are  evident  in  the  two  rankings  in 
Figure  3,  each  based on  the  same  one-day  pretrial 
population data. 
Underlying  these  difficulties  is  a  subtle  legal  and 
philosophical problem with this indicator.  By itself, 
even a lot of pretrial detention might not be unjust.  
If  a  society  has  a  relatively  high  rate  of  crime, 
apprehends  its  many  offenders  effectively,  holds 
them briefly, and then relies principally on sentences 
other than prison, it would have a high percentage of 
its prisoners in pretrial detention at any one time and 
a relatively high rate of pretrial detention per capita, 
but the actual use of pretrial detention might be quite 
reasonable.    Pretrial  detention  is  unjust  when  it  is 
imposed  on  people  accused  of  trivial  crimes,  used 
without  even  minimal  evidence  of  guilt,  entails 
inhumane  conditions  of  detention,  or  lasts 
excessively  long.    Indeed,  prolonged  pretrial 
detention may be the worst of these, for it is offensive 
to the rule of law in its own right while exacerbating 
all  other  forms  of  pretrial  injustice:    the  over-
punishment  of  trivial  offenses,  detention  without 
evidence, and inhumane conditions of confinement. 
Counting the number of people in pretrial detention 
on  any  day  and  comparing  these  with  either  the 
prison  population  or  the  national  population  can 
capture  these  forms  of  injustice  at  best  only 
indirectly, and may not measure them at all.  
What,  then,  explains  the  attraction  of  volume 
indicators, and especially the percentage of prisoners 
in  pretrial  detention?    The  chief  virtue  of  these 
measures  is  the  ease  with  which  they  can  be 
generated  by  prison  officials.    Nearly  all  prison 
officials distinguish and regularly report the number 
of inmates in their custody that are sentenced and 
un-sentenced.    The  Controller  of  Prisons  in  Lagos 
State,  Nigeria,  for  instance,  keeps  track  of  the 
number  of  inmates  by  legal  status  in  each  facility 
with monthly updates on a chalkboard, as shown in  
   
 
Figure 3.  Two Indicators of Pretrial Detention, Selected Countries, 2009 
 
                   
 
Data are from the 2009 World Prison Brief, produced by the International Centre for Prison Studies and available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org. Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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the image in Figure 4.  It is thus easy to collect these 
data  from  a  country’s  prisons,  divide  the  pretrial 
detainees by the total prison population, and report 
the percentage. Yet for the all its ease of calculation, 
this indicator may distract officials and donors from 
important signs of progress.  Even studying the raw 
numbers  of  pretrial  detainees  would  be  an 
improvement.  For example, in Lagos, Nigeria, where 
prison  crowding  is  extreme,  especially  in  facilities 
such  as  Ikoyi  Prison  that  are  used  principally  for 
awaiting  trial  male  prisoners  (―ATM‖  in  Figure  4), 
the  proportion  of  un-sentenced  inmates  has  held 
steady for the past five years.  And yet, in a reversal 
of the situation in Spain and as Figure 5 shows, there 
was a 24 percent decline in the total number of un-
sentenced  inmates  in  this  same  period  –  a 
Figure 4.  Inmate Population Tracking Device, Commissioner of Prisons, Lagos, Nigeria 
 
 
Figure 5.  Pretrial Detainees, Ikoyi Prison, Lagos, Nigeria 
 
Source:  Warden of Ikoyi Prison, ―Daily State Book.‖ 
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remarkable  reduction  for  any  justice  system,  with 
benefits for guards and detainees and their families 
alike.    This  improvement  went  largely  unnoticed, 
however,  in  part  because  of  attention  to  the 
percentage of prisoners held pretrial.  When, in 2010, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions saw the chart in 
Figure  5  at  an  interagency  meeting  in  Lagos,  she 
exclaimed:    ―now  that  we  see  that  things  can 
improve, it makes us want to shoot for the moon.‖ 
The raw number of un-sentenced inmates in prison 
on  any  given  day  may  have  more  promise  as  an 
indicator  than  the  percentage  of  inmates  not  yet 
tried  or  sentenced,  for  at  least  its  changes  are  all 
related to the administration of pretrial justice.  Yet 
an  indicator  of  the  duration  of  pretrial  detention 
would  measure  forthrightly  what  these  volume 
indicators hint  at  only  indirectly.    Lengthy  pretrial 
detention is itself an injustice and it exacerbates the 
other injustices that may accompany any detention. 
Moreover, a measure of the duration of detention can 
help  judges,  prosecutors,  and  other  court 
professionals develop techniques to reduce the time 
that  suspects  spend  in  detention  without 
compromising other principles of justice.  
There are two steps required in the development of 
an indicator of the duration of detention.  First, one 
must collect data on the duration of each detention: 
the  number  of  days  elapsed  between  the  person’s 
arrival  in  detention  and  the  person’s  release  or 
sentencing.    Second,  one  must  analyze  the  data 
calculating  either  an  average  (the  mean)  or  the 
median  period  of  detention,  examining  the 
distribution  of  cases  at  the  extremes  (very  long 
periods  of  detention  and  very  short  ones),  and 
disaggregating the data to identify opportunities to 
achieve  substantial  improvements  through  focused 
work on some sub-group of detainees.  The choice of 
indicators is heavily contextual, guided as much by 
the  particular  authority  of  the  officials  or 
organizations seeking reform as by the nature of the 
problems evident in the data. 
The remainder of this paper addresses both steps in 
this  process  in  low  and  middle-income  countries, 
using Nigeria as our principal example.  The same 
principles  apply  in  high-income  countries,  but  the 
collection of the raw data is often easier when more 
administrative data is automated, and the choice of 
indicator more straightforward when the authority of 
the  officials  involved  is  more  direct.    We  focus,  in 
short,  on  an  especially  difficult  case,  delving  down 
into the details to make the general lessons explicit. 
 
Measuring the Duration of Detention 
The conventional wisdom about pretrial detention in 
Nigeria and many other developing countries, too, is 
that it is extremely long for all types of defendants.  
Some published reports give the impression that, on 
average,  defendants  in  Nigeria  spend  years  in 
custody  before  trial.3  The  practice  of  detaining 
suspects in police lock-ups for unspecified periods of 
time  on  ―holding  charges‖  contributes  to  this 
impression.4  But no one knows how long detention 
lasts.  Notwithstanding the impressions of people 
who  administer  criminal  justice,  there  is  lit tle 
evidence  and  almost  no  systematic  data  reported 
about  the  duration  of  detention  for  suspects 
remanded into custody before trial.  (This is not just 
a problem in low and middle-income countries.  The 
comprehensive  report  on  Spain  discussed  earlier 
contains no data on the duration of pretrial detention 
there.) 
We asked the Lagos State Attorney General, Solicitor 
General, Commissioner of Police, and Commissioner 
of Prisons if they knew or had any hard data on the 
duration  of  detention.    Each  replied  ―no.‖    The 
Warden  at  Ikoyi  Prison  said  the  same  thing.  
Showing us the ―daily state book‖ used to record the 
number of inmates coming and leaving prison each 
day, he lamented that there was no information on 
the  length  of  stay.    But  when  a  team  from  the 
Attorney  General’s  office,  the  Lagos-based  CLEEN 
Foundation,  and  Harvard  University  examined  the 
remand and ―production warrants‖ that accompany 
inmates conveyed from prison to court, we noticed 
the date of admission typed just above the signature 
of  the  judge,  and  the  dates  of  all  court  hearings 
written in red ink on the reverse side, along with the 
date on which the inmate left Ikoyi.  That was all the 
information needed to measure length of stay. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Anthony Nwapa, “Building and Sustaining 
Change:  Pretrial Detention Reform in Nigeria,” Justice 
Initiatives, Open Society Institute, 2008.  See also J Nnamdi 
Aduba and Emily Alemika, “Bail and the Criminal Justice 
Administration in Nigeria,” pages 85-109 (chapter 5) in The 
Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice in Africa, Monograph no. 
161, 2009, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.  
4 Defendants are sometimes remanded into custody by 
magistrates’ courts with no jurisdiction to try defendants.  
Known colloquially as a “holding charge, this practice is 
unconstitutional according to an unpublished legal brief by the 
Director of Public Prosecution in 2009.  It appears to 
contravene Article 27 of the Police Act, and is not recognized in 
the 2007 Law on the Administration of Justice. Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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From  the  records  room,  the  warden  retrieved  the 
warrants  of  all  inmates  that  left  Ikoyi  in  January, 
March,  May,  July,  and September  2010.    For  each 
inmate, the team entered into an excel spreadsheet 
the  date  of  entry  and  exit,  along  with  basic 
identifying  information,  such  as  the  inmate’s 
prisoner number, the charge, the name of the court 
that  remanded  and  released  the  defendant,  the 
amount of bail, if required, and the official reason for 
the  inmate’s  departure  (bail,  case  struck  out, 
discharged, acquitted, etc).  A two person team from 
CLEEN  and  the  Attorney  General’s  office  took  ten 
days to code information for all 1608 exits.  The team 
soon  became  proficient  with  data  entry,  requiring 
less  than  five  minutes,  on  average,  to  enter  the 
relevant information for each exiting inmate into the 
data collection instrument shown in Figure 6. 
Subtracting  the  number  of  days  between  prison 
admission  and  exit,  we  found  that  the  majority  of 
inmates  spend  short  periods  of  time  in  detention.  
The average length of stay for all inmates was 73.4 
days.  The median length of stay was just 19 days, 
since most inmates stayed very short periods of time.  
Indeed,  as  Figure  7  shows,  one  third  of  detainees 
went home within a week, the vast majority released 
on  bail.    Another  29 percent  left  in  the  next  three 
 
Figure 6.  Data Collection Instrument, Ikoyi Prison Exit Sample, 2010 
 
 
Charge 
Number
Prisoner 
Number
Remand 
Warrant 
Date Remand Court
Arrest Charge 
(Narrative)
Criminal 
Code Section 
(or other 
statute) Bail Amount
Date of Next 
Calendared 
Hearing
Date of Next 
Court 
Appearance 
(actual)
Name of 
Release Court Exit Date
Exit Reason 
(Bail, Acquittal, 
Dismissal,(etc)
Ep/50/2010 F4378/2010 14/9/2010 Mgt Cour Epe felony to commit assault,516.351 No amount 28/9/2010 14/9/2010 Mgt Cour Epe 14/9/2010 bail perfected
G/68/2010 F4610/2010 28/9/2010 C7 Ebutemetta conspiracy, stealing 516.390 100,000 with two surty 17/11/2010 28/9/2010 C7 Ebutemetta 28/9/2010 struck out
G/68/2010 F46/11/2010 28/9/2010 C7 Ebutemetta conspiracy,forgery 430 100,000 with two surty 11-03-2010 28/9/2010 C7 Ebutemetta 28/9/2010 bail perfected
Mcs/237/2010 F4433/2010 20/9/2010 C12 Shomolu Affray 83 50,000 with one surty 15/10/2010 21/9/2010 C12 Shomolu 21/9/2010 discharged
P/65/2010 F4528/2010 23/9/2010 c14 Tinubu conspiracy,beach of peace 516,81 500,000 with two surty 10-11-2010 24/9/2010 c14 Tinubu 24/9/2010 bail perfected
P/65/2010 F4528/2010 23/9/2010 c14 Tinubu conspiracy,beach of peace 516,81 500,000 with two surty 10-11-2010 24/9/2010 c14 Tinubu 24/9/2010 acquitted
K/72/2010 F4484/2010 21/9/2010 C9 Tinubu conspiracy, breach of peace 516, 50,000 with two surty 14/10/2010 22/9/2010 C9 Tinubu 22/9/2010 fine paid
H/69/2010 F4635/2010 29/9/2010 C11 Ebutemettaunlawful damage, breaking and entry, stealing 411.451.390 100,000 with two surty 27/10/2010 30/9/2010 C11 Ebutemetta30/9/2010 struck out
MCs/240/2010 F4593/2010 28/9/2010 C12 Shomolu conspiracy,stealing 516.390 200,000 with two surty 18/10/2010 29/9/2010 C12 Shomolu 29/9/2010 bail perfected
 
Figure 7.  Percentage of Inmates Leaving Ikoyi Prison, by Selected Time Intervals 
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weeks.    Most  of  the  remaining  detainees  spent 
relatively short periods of time in custody, too:   18 
percent  stayed  1-3  months,  11  percent  stayed  4-6 
months, and 5 percent stayed 6 and 12 months.  Just 
4 percent remained in custody more than a year, a 
proportion similar to those kept in custody for 6 to 12 
months.   
Justice  officials  in  Lagos  were  surprised  by  the 
findings.    Some  prison  officials  were  perplexed 
because  inmates  with  whom  they  were  familiar  or 
saw on a daily basis were individuals who had stayed 
in custody a long time, leaving the impression that a 
majority  of  inmates  spend  lengthy  periods  in 
detention.    But  the  churn  of  inmates,  the  high 
volume  of  rapid  turnover  in  the  prison,  was 
confirmed by the repetition of the exit sample every 
two months:  for each of the months that we analyzed 
exits,  at  least  fifty  percent  of  inmates  left  prison 
within a month of their arrival. 
 
From Research Results to Prototype Indicators 
The  results  of  the  exit  samples  are  not  indicators 
themselves.    Just  as  research  findings  are  not 
automatically converted into insights or conclusions, 
the results of the exit samples require interpretation.  
They  also  raise  difficult  questions.    If  most 
defendants are released soon after they enter prison, 
how could the duration of detention be reduced any 
further?  Could justice officials realistically improve 
upon this result?  If so, what would be the value of 
accelerating  the  already  rapid  rate  at  which  most 
detainees leave prison?  Would activities that reduce 
the duration of detention significantly reduce prison 
overcrowding?    What  measure  of  the  duration  of 
detention would best work as an indicator, and who 
would lead the effort? 
The  selection  of  an  indicator  and  also  the 
identification  of  appropriate  reform  strategies 
involve a careful calibration of purpose and power.  
The Attorney General in Lagos does not control the 
police or courts or prisons, so he must use indicators 
such  as  the  median  length  of  detention  to  remind 
other  officials  to  pay  attention  to  the  duration  of 
detention  and  exhort  them  to  avoid  compromising 
system-level  goals  in  the  pursuit  of  institutional 
objectives.  In addition, to demonstrate leadership on 
the problem of pretrial detention, he wanted to select 
 
Figure 8.  Duration of Detention by Type of Release and Jail Bed Consumption, Ikoyi Prison, 2010 
 
 
Release Type 
Number 
of 
Defendant
s in 
Sample 
Percent 
of 
Sample 
Average 
Length of 
Stay 
(days) 
 
Median 
Length 
of Stay 
(days) 
 
Total 
Number 
of days 
in 
Custody 
 
 
Percent of 
all days in 
Custody 
Acquitted  2  0,1%  115  115  230  0,2% 
Other*  9   0,4%  413  269  5750  5,0% 
Withdrawn  18  1,1%  122  108  2187  1,9% 
Jail term completed  20  1,2%  92  41  1845  1,6% 
Fines Paid & 
Discharged  50  3,1%  6  2  317  0,3% 
Discharged  76  4,7%  159  43  12064  10,4% 
Struck out  258  16,1%  111  61  28574  24,7% 
Bail Perfected  1171  73,1%  63  13  64655  55,9% 
Total**  1604   100%  70,2  19  115622  100,0% 
 
*includes: no exit information, bench warrant rescinded, case dismissed, life imprisonment, transfer 
** For four cases we were unable to determine the release type. Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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a  particular  problem  whose  resolution  could  be 
affected  with  existing  resources  by  prosecutors,  a 
justice  function  he  controlled  somewhat  more 
directly  than  others,  though  most  prosecutions  in 
Nigeria are the responsibility of the police.   
The way defendants leave prison provided a clue for 
the choice of an indicator that prosecutors (whether 
police or the DPP) might move.  As the data in Figure 
8  show,  defendants  whose  prosecutions  were 
―withdrawn‖  remained  in  detention,  on  average, 
nearly twice as long as those who perfected bail (121 
vs 63 days).  Defendants whose cases were ―struck 
out‖ – that is, dismissed by a court – also stayed in 
jail nearly twice as long (111 days).  Together, the 17 
percent  of  defendants  that  left  prison  after  their 
cases were struck out or withdrawn used 27 percent 
of all the days in custody in our sample. 
Because these outcomes are likely susceptible to the 
influence of a prosecutor, the duration of detention 
for  inmates  leaving  prison  after  their  cases  are 
withdrawn  or  struck  out  is  likely  to  be  a  good 
indicator.  It is aligned with a government function 
that  can  improve  it.    In  Nigeria,  however,  this 
prosecutorial function is itself divided.  The DPP staff 
only influence decisions about charge for suspects in 
murder and armed robbery cases, and a small subset 
of defendants charged with theft.  A majority of the 
defendants in our sample were charged with stealing, 
simple  assault,  and  breaches  of  public  order  – 
offenses  prosecuted  by  the  police.    The  Attorney 
General therefore could only recommend that police 
more  closely  supervise  the  investigators  in  these 
cases to reduce these times, while setting an example 
for  the  police  by  focusing  on  the  small  number  of 
cases under his control.  
 
The Duration of Prosecution 
One of the few justice functions exclusively under the 
control of the Attorney General is the filing of legal 
advice,  a  prerequisite  for  charging  defendants  in 
court  with  offenses  punishable  by  more  than  two 
years  imprisonment.    Influenced  by  the  findings 
from the prison exit samples, the Attorney General’s 
office decided to find out how long it took to file such 
advice.    With  a  modified  version  of  the  data 
collection instrument used for the prison exit sample, 
the AG’s office recorded the dates for each step of the 
criminal process in the 48 cases the DPP completed 
in 2009.  It discovered that it took prosecutors 142 
days on average to file legal advice.  While this was a 
negligible  share  of  the  overall  amount  of  time 
between the commission of a crime and the verdict of 
a court – which averaged more than 4 years -- the 
process was still remarkably slow and, he believed, 
unjustified.    Resolved  to  fix  the  problem,  the  AG’s 
office instituted a ―tracking device‖ to measure the 
number of days that elapse between  each phase of 
the  process  of  filing  advice.    The  Solicitor  General 
recommended  to  the  DPP  that  the  total  period  of 
time  required  to  complete  this  task  should  not 
exceed  30  days  as  anticipated  by provisions  of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Law of 2007.  An 
indicator was born. 
Between May and August 2010, the Attorney General 
and  DPP  regularly  reviewed  the  number  of days  it 
took to file legal advice in the robbery and homicide 
cases  forwarded  to  them  by  the  Criminal 
Investigations  Division  of  the  Lagos  State  Police.  
They also agreed to eliminate some of the multiple 
layers of review of draft opinions – extra steps that 
may have added accountability and quality assurance 
at the expense of timeliness.  In just three months, 
the amount of time required to file legal advice fell 
threefold.    As  Figure  9  shows,  for  cases  in  which 
prosecutors  filed  legal  advice  in  August  2010,  the 
―turnaround time‖ was just 44 days. 
These improvements are important in the cases they 
affect, but they are symbolic in the larger effort to 
reduce  pretrial  detention.    To  convert  these 
prototypes into active indicators, used by officials to 
reduce pretrial detention, the Attorney General will 
need  to  engage  the  police  prosecutors  and  their 
superiors. 
 
The Duration of Detention for Long-Term Stays 
Prison  crowding  in  Lagos  has,  we  now  know, 
multiple  sources:    a  large  number  of  defendants 
spending  relatively  short  periods  of  time  in 
detention;  a  smaller  but  sizeable  number  of 
defendants whose charges are dismissed, withdrawn, 
or  struck  out  after  more  than  three  months  of 
incarceration;  and  a  very  small  number  of 
defendants  who  remain  in  prison  a  very  long  time 
before  their  cases  are  resolved.    All  of  these 
contributors to crowding require their own indicator 
and remedial strategy.   Prison Exit Samples as a Source for Indicators of Pretrial Detention 
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Defendants who spend extended periods of time in 
detention  are  a  special  concern  because  of  the 
consequences  of  prolonged  detention  for  their 
health,  the  impact  on  the  congestion  of  the  court 
calendar,  and  the  repercussions  for  the  reputation 
and legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  They 
also have a disproportionate impact on the extent of 
crowding.    Calculations  from  the  exit  samples  at 
Ikoyi Prison show that the four percent of suspects 
that  remained  in  detention  for  a  year  or  more 
accounted for almost half (47.5 percent) of the prison 
space occupied over time.  Completing all of the long 
term cases (those that have already kept a suspect in 
detention for a year) before the end of another six 
months  in  detention  would  reduce  the  remand 
population by 17 percent.  Such a reduction would 
augment considerably the strategies already devised 
by  the  Attorney  General  and  Director  of  Criminal 
Investigations in Lagos.  Only with the participation 
of the judiciary, however, could a strategy be devised 
to achieve that goal.  The Attorney General and his 
staff hope to enlist that participation by convening a 
quarterly  interagency  meeting  of  managers,  each 
armed with an indicator they design. It is in these 
kinds  of  empirically  informed  meetings  that 
meaningful conversations about law and justice can 
have special force. 
Standard Indicators and International Standards 
There are many ways one could measure the extent 
of pretrial detention, in Nigeria or any country.  We 
have  focused  here  first  on  the  most  common 
measures, based on the population in detention on a 
given  day,  and  then  on  duration,  a  measure 
especially  well  suited  to  pretrial  reform  efforts.   
There  are  other  possibilities,  such  as  the  flow  of 
suspects  into  detention.   When  calculated  from 
prison or jail data, this produces an indicator of the 
number  of  detainees  beginning  their  pretrial 
detention  each  week,  month,  or  year.    When 
calculated from court data, it produces an indicator 
of  persons  detained  as  a  percentage  of  all  accused 
persons  bound  over  for  trial.     Another  possible 
indicator is the percentage of prosecutorial requests 
for detention that are granted, or the percentage of 
defense  requests  for  release  that  are  granted;  but 
both  of  these  require  comprehensive  data  on 
prosecution  and  defense  requests  that  are  rarely 
available.   We have focused here on indicators of the 
duration of pretrial detention not because they are 
always  preferable  to  these  other  measures,  but 
because they are especially useful and practical for 
reform efforts.  The administrative data required are 
usually available by sampling exits from detention; 
 
Figure 9.  Turnaround Time for Filing Legal Advice, DPP, Lagos, August 2010 
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the resulting indicators focus attention on an aspect 
of  pretrial  detention  that  prosecutors,  judges,  and 
court  administrators  can  control;  and  they  directly 
measure  one  of  the  major  sources  of  pretrial 
injustice:  prolonged detention without trial. 
There  is  no  hard  international  standard  against 
which the duration of detention can be assessed.   As 
international courts and conventions recognize, what 
constitutes  ―prolonged‖  detention,  ―unreasonable‖ 
delay,  or  ―speedy‖  trials  depends  both  on  the 
complexity of the case and on the normative context.  
 Three  months  may  be  ―prolonged‖  in  some  cases, 
while six months may be ―reasonable‖ in others, but 
the longer the period of detention without trial, the 
greater the affront to justice and the affront is greater 
still when the conditions of detention are severe, the 
charges  minor,  or  the  evidence  entirely  untested.  
 For  those  reasons,  domestic  governments, 
international  development  agencies,  and  advocates 
alike  could  use  a  standard  way  of  measuring  this 
duration,  whatever  the  meaning  ascribed  to  the 
results.   Standard indicators, in this field at least, are  
undoubtedly  preferable  to  international  standards, 
encouraging  internationally  informed  domestic 
conversations  about  the  meaning  of  justice  rather 
than  mimicry  of  foreign  practices.    Prison  exit 
samples  represent  one  method  of  generating  a 
standard indicator of the duration of detention and 
thereby  encouraging  that  domestic  discourse  on 
justice.  The method could be replicated in multiple 
countries  and  in  multiple  facilities,  placing  the 
domestic conversation about the reform of detention 
on  a  sound  empirical  footing  while  furnishing 
international  agencies  with  some  genuinely 
comparable indicators. 
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